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THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION:
TOWARD A WORKABLE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
Introduction
In the twenty years following World War II, the volume of com-
munications traffic from the United States to Europe increased by
83,000 per cent.' This expansion provided a major impetus for the
development of a communications technology superior to that em-
bodied in the three existing methods of international communication:
undersea telephone cables, short wave radio broadcasts, and postal
services. Today, the zenith of communications technology is repre-
sented by communication satellites, orbiting systems which relay tele-
phone, television, and data messages over great distances. These satel-
lites, barely past their technological infancy, already offer substantial
economic and technical benefits in comparison with their predecessors
in global communications.
The maintenance of efficient international communications is an
important factor in the formulation of effective foreign policy and in
the exercise of political power. The need for instantaneous dialogue
between policy makers in Washington D.C. and American diplomats
abroad, as well as the potentially disastrous consequences of delays in
communications among state leaders, were apparent to the Kennedy
administration and the 87th Congress;2 both governmental branches
viewed the creation of an integrated communications satellite system
as essential. 3 In an effort to continue the technological leadership of
the United States in the field of international communications, Congress
in 1962 granted a statutory monopoly to the Communications Satellite
Corporation (Comsat).4 In addition to creating a new carrier with spe-
cial corporate duties, this legislation enabled Comsat as the designated
entity of the United States to plan, construct, own, and operate this
1. Johnson, Satellites Will Compete for Major Role in Commercial Communica-
tions Traffic, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 7, 1966, at 124.
2. Hearings on S. 2814 and S. 2814, Amendment, Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1962).
3. See S. REP. No. 1544, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27 (1962) (Statement of Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1544].
4. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 101-404, 76 Stat. 419 (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1970)).
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country's allocated portion of a global communications satellite system.
Comsat's uniqueness was not predicated on its role as an official U.S.
negotiator in global communications; for years, private common carriers
such as American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), Western Union
International (WUI), International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T),
and RCA Global Communications, Inc. (RCA), had negotiated di-
rectly with official representatives of foreign governments on behalf of
the United States. Only Comsat, however, was protected as a statutory
monopoly.
In the years since its creation in 1962, Comsat has undergone sub-
stantial change. This note will survey the evolution of this unusual cor-
poration, focusing particularly on the legislative history of the Com-
munications Satellite Act and the congressional debate concerning
whether Comsat should be publicly or privately owned. The survey
will also examine the "mysterious retreat" of the private common car-
riers from 50 percent stock ownership in Comsat, as well as the corpo-
ration's role in the creation of the global satellite system called Intelsat.
The discussion will demonstrate Comsat's increasing independence and
assertiveness. Legislation is now pending which would restructure the
statutory scheme of the 1962 Satellite Act.5 Proponents frequently
characterize certain sections of this new legislation as "mere house-
keeping measures."6 Critical evaluation of these sections, however, re-
veals them to be far more significant than their detractors would allow
and indicates that many of these "housekeeping measures" would op-
erate in a manner directly contrary to the public interest. This note
will therefore suggest several modifications to the bills now being con-
sidered in congressional committees. 7
Legislative History
Background
During the second world war and in the cold war years that fol-
lowed, research and development in missile launch techniques and in
the electronic systems involved accelerated substantially. The success-
ful Soviet orbiting of Sputnik on October 4, 1957,8 convinced even the
most reluctant of the world's populace that we had finally entered an
5. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
6. Interview with Thomas Keller, Office of Telecommunications Policy, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Aug. 2, 1974.
7. The bills are currently before the Subcommittee on Communications of the
Senate Commerce Committee and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
of the House of Representatives.
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1957, at 1, 3, col. 4.
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age of practical space technology. Particularly rapid progress in the
area of electronics foreshadowed an early use of this technology in com-
munications by means of space satellite.
Existing global communications networks in the early 1960s con-
sisted primarily of three AT&T transatlantic cables; a fourth was pro-
posed.9 Active competition flourished among the primary telegraph
carriers, IT&T, RCA and WUI; the demands for international tele-
phone facilities and telex service increased rapidly, and as a result, the
number of leased circuits proliferated. 10 It soon became apparent that
merely increasing the circuit supply would provide only stopgap treat-
ment of the demand for more communications channels. For example,
the proposed cable mentioned above would have added only one hun-
dred and twenty-eight voice-grade circuits to the already insufficient
supply." The acceleration of demand and the obvious deficiency in
circuit supply made apparent the need for an alternative source of com-
munications circuits. The answer devised and proposed by the Ken-
nedy administration was a publicly-created, privately-owned communi-
cations satellite corporation.
Public or Private Ownership?
The corporation, which was created during the period of the great-
est sustained industrial growth since World War II, evoked considerable
enthusiasm in nearly all segments of American society and was praised
as an important part of President Kennedy's new frontier.' Nonethe-
less, the specific form which this entity would take was the subject of
controversy, and the solution eventually reached was the product of
compromise.' 3 Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach delineated three possible
ownership alternatives for the proposed satellite corporation in 1962:
9. Compare American Tel. & Tel. Co., 37 F.C.C. 1151 (1964) with American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 27 F.C.C. 113 (1959).
10. For example, telephone messages in 1964 experienced an approximate 20%
per year growth. Ende, International Telecommunications: Dynamics of Regulation
of a Rapidly Expanding Service, 34 LAw AND CoNTEMp. PROB. 389, 399 (1969).
11. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1155 (1964). The term "voice
grade" refers to a circuit of sufficient quality to transmit voice messages.
12. S. REP. No. 1544, supra note 3, at 27 (1962) (letter from President Kennedy
to Vice-President Johnson and Speaker of the House McCormick).
13. See J. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICA-
TIONS 11, 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as GALLOWAY]. Galloway discussed the parties
to the various compromises and concessions: "Within the Executive branch, the princi-
pal departments and agencies responsible for space communications policy, in addition
to the President, are the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the National
Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), the Office of Telecommunications Policy
(OTP), the Defense Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of
State. The Federal Communications Commission, to some degree an independent regu-
latory commission, has an important part in the policy process. Congressional commit-
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[T]he organization of a system, or the United States portion of it,
might follow one of three basic forms: first, government owner-
ship, in which private enterprise would be limited to participation
under contracts. The Administration did not advocate government
ownership because it was felt to be probably unnecessary and not
the best way to do this job. Second, private ownership by the ex-
isting communications industry only, which would have meant
single-company domination [AT&T] of the system. The Admin-
istration did not recommend this second alternative for [antitrust]
policy reasons . . .. Finally, private ownership, with broad par-
ticipation by the public in the ownership of the system. This was
the concept selected to serve as the basis of proposed legislation.
It offers better prospects that the system will be adequately capital-
ized than if the system were ,to be a captive project of a single in-
dustry; it tends to safeguard against the dangers of single company
domination; and it is also fair to the American taxpayer, whose ex-
penditures on government research have made a communications
satellite system possible, and who should have an equal opportunity
to invest in the system.14
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had begun an
investigation to determine what type of organization and ownership
would be best suited to a satellite communications system as early as
tees dealing in communications are as follows: in the Senate-the Committee of Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences, the Commerce Committee, the Select Committee on Small
Business, and the Foreign Relations Committee; in the House-the Committee on Sci-
ence and Astronautics, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and the Com-
mittee on Government Operations.
"Within the business community, communications interests can be classified into
those of the international common carriers, domestic common carriers, television and
radio broadcasters, and manufacturers. The Bell System encompasses three subtypes,
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) being an international and
domestic common carrier, while the Western Electric Company is the manufacturing en-
tity. Other important international common carriers are Western Union International
(WUI), International Telephone and Telegraph Company, World Communications
(ITT World Coin), Radio Corporation of America, Global Communications (RCAGC),
Hawaiian Telephone Company (HTC), and Press Wireless. The domestic common car-
riers are many, but here the two big giants, AT&T for telephone and Western Union
(WU) for telegraph, may be mentioned. Television and radio companies include the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the National Broadcasting Company (NBC),
and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Manufacturers include RCA, Philco,
General Telephone and Electric Company (GT&E), Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
Hughes Aircraft Company, and the General Electric Company (GE).
"The international organizations which have been concerned with space communi-
cations are the United Nations (UN) and certain specialized agencies, particularly the
ITU [International Telecommunications Union]. Foreign nations have been involved
with American space communications policy, but did not play an active part in the pol-
icy-making process leading up to the passage of the Communications Satellite Act in
1962. They have, of course, participated in the activities of the UN and the ITU."
14. Address by Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Federal Bar Association of New York,
New Jersey, & Connecticut, in New York City, May 25, 1962, in 7 ANTrrnusr BULL.
421, 425-26 (1962).
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March 1961. The large international common carriers in their first ad
hoc report on May 24, 1961, favored the creation of a limited joint ven-
ture in which only the participants could invest;15 they hoped to insulate
the existing communications oligopoly from external financial participa-
tion. The aerospace industry, represented by such companies as Gen-
eral Electric and Lockheed Aircraft, requested that their industry also
have an investment option in any satellite venture.' Earlier in May
of 1961, the Department of Justice in a statement to the FCC, cau-
tioned that all communications carriers, manufacturers, and sellers must
be allowed to participate- in the ownership of any proposed system, im-
plying that a more limited form of ownership would not be consistent
with federal antitrust laws. 7
The satellite communications system can well be a prime example
of the effective operation of the free enterprise system, and it is,
therefore, of vital importance to the national interest that no single
private concern dominate satellite communications.' 8
Nonetheless, later that month the FCC tentatively concluded' 9 that the
joint venture format proposed by the common carriers was the best al-
ternative then in existence. On July 24, 1961, President Kennedy, in
a statement of national policy to the Senate, declared: "private owner-
ship and operation of the U.S. portion of the global system is favored
provided that such ownership and operation meet . . . [certain] policy
requirements."20  President Kennedy further indicated in a letter to
Vice-President Johnson and Speaker of the House McCormick that
while the subject of an ownership format was essentially a matter for
private enterprise, it was also of paramount importance to determina-
tions regarding national and international interests and policies.2 ' The
president noted that the corporation was a government created monop-
oly and therefore investment should not be limited to a few existing
communications carriers.22 He indicated that broadly based stock own-
ership was needed to accommodate "potential investors who have equal
15. See Hearings on Space Communications and S.J. Res. 32 Before a Subcomm.
of The Senate Commerce Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1961) (report of the Ad
Hoc Carrier Committee).
16. GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 28-29.
17. Hearings on Public Policy Questions on the Ownership and Control of a Space
Satellite Communications System Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Se-
lect Comm. on Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1961) (statement of the De-
partment of Justice).
18. Id. at 31.
19. See GALLowAY, supra note 13, at 51.
20. S. REP. No. 1544, supra note 3, at 26 (statement of President John F. Ken-
nedy).
21. Id. at 27 (letter from President Kennedy to Vice-President Johnson and
Speaker of the House McCormick).
22. Id. at 28.
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rights to own a part of this federally developed enterprise. '23 Disregard-
ing the president's stock ownership suggestions, three months later, on
October 13, 1961, the FCC ad hoc committee's report advocated that
the federal government approve a nonprofit organization of United
States common carriers, specifying only that it should not be dominated
by a single carrier. The carrier to which the report referred was
AT&T. 24 Finally, in February of 1962, President Kennedy sent a mes-
sage to Congress proposing the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.25
The measure was to create a new corporation whose board of directors
would include common carriers, public shareholders, and three presi-
dential appointees. Members of Congress responded with a flurry of
bills proposing a variety of public and private ownership plans.26
While the public was intoxicated with romantic illusions of plane-
tary harmony deriving from communications satellites, the giant com-
munication carriers were preparing for a powerful lobbying effort.
The purpose of this effort was to convince Congress that the nation's
share of the international satellite system should be controlled by pri-
vate enterprise.
Representatives from AT&T, IT&T, RCA, and General Tele-
phone and Electronics, among others, appeared before congressional
committee hearings on the proposed Communications Satellite Act of
1962.27 Western Union International and the United States Independ-
ent Telephone Association submitted written statements. 28  Groups in-
cluding the National Association of Manufacturers, United States
Chamber of Commerce, Hughes Aircraft, and General Electric lobbied
extensively.29 Only two groups favored government ownership: the
Americans for Democratic Action and the National Telephone Cooper-
ative Association.3" Their influence was dwarfed by the enormous cor-
porate push for private ownership.
Communications carriers, in an effort to quell the turmoil sur-
rounding public ownership, pointed out that private control of telecom-
munications facilities and systems was the rule rather than the excep-
tion in the United States. The carriers ignored the striking difference
between the technology embodied in their existing facilities and that
23. Id.
24. See Hearings on Space Communications and S.i. Res. 32 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Commerce Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 203, 226 (1961) (report of Ad
Hoc Carrier Committee).
25. S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
26. See GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 52-53.
27. See id. at 62.
28. See id. at 52.
29. See id. at 62.
30. See id.
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involved in the new satellite systems. While conventional terrestrial
communications systems such as cable and microwave relays have been
developed mostly through private financing,31 communications satel-
lites can be viewed as largely the offspring of federally funded research
and development.3 2 Thus, the communications carriers were not, in
their bid for private ownership, merely seeking to maintain the status
quo. They were seeking, by means of political pressure, to reap the
benefits of a satellite and launch technology paid for to a great extent
by public funds.
A compromise bill was reported to the floor of the House on May
3, 1962, and passed by a vote of 354 to 9.33 The compromise bill,
however, did not meet with such expeditious approval in the Senate,
where vigorous committee debates arose concerning the most appropri-
ate form of ownership. The Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, chaired by Senator Robert S. Kerr, co-sponsor, with Senator
Warren G. Magnuson, of the administration bill, reported the bill favor-
ably to the floor of the Senate on April 2.34  The hearings conducted
by the committee generally evidenced support of President Kennedy's
proposals. 5 Debate continued, as Senator Estes Kefauver and the
Americans for Democratic Action urged adoption of an independent
federal authority to oversee satellite development.3 6 Senator Kefauver
31. See id. at 9, 15.
32. See id. at 55.
33. See id. at 65.
34. S. R p. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1962).
35. See Hearings on S. 2814 and S. 2814, Amendment, Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
36. Arguments in favor of government ownership centered around the following
observations: (1) The Government was operating other special agencies, such as the
Atomic Energy Commission and NASA, in which subcontractors were involved; (2)
capitalization by the federal government could avoid conflicts of interest; (3) the gov-
ernment would provide equal access for all potential users; (4) the government could
ensure better controls of rate schedules and promotional pricing; (5) the federal budget
could more easily bear the cost of technical obsolescence, thus lowering the risk that
carriers would switch to conventional cable circuits in times of diminished demand; and
(6) the government could achieve full coordination of military and civilian programs
much more easily than it could under conditions of natural monopoly.
Opponents of federal control articulated the following views: (1) Government con-
trol would become a "foot in the door" for similar control of other communication re-
lated industries; (2) federal funds in the form of research and development would dis-
rupt the flow of private capital; (3) private companies would be better able than the
government to get the needed scientific and engineering talent in a much shorter period
of time; (4) private ownership would ensure that the costs of economic development
would be placed on the shoulders of those who actually used the system; and (5) al-
though satellites were technically advanced and their use raised complicated foreign pol-
icy implications, communications development should, as in the past, be undertaken by
the international common carriers, as they could act more expeditiously than the govern-
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led the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, which vigorously
opposed private ownership as a violation of antitrust laws and a give-
away of government investment in communications satellite technol-
ogy.37 Senators Ralph W. Yarborough and E. L. Bartlett, of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, also expressed the minority view:
This corporation [Comsat] would be a Government-created
private monopoly. Such legislation is without precedent in the his-
tory of 'the United States. It runs counter to the historical and tra-
ditional hostility to private monopoly that has served as a founda-
tion of this country's economic system of competitive free enter-
prise.
Not only does the committee bill create a private monopoly,
it would go even further and bestow on that single private monop-
oly the benefits of billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money. This
legislation, if enacted, likely would constitute the biggest giveaway
in the history of the United States.
All the elements necessary for the very existence of an opera-
tional satellite communications system have been financed by all
the taxpayers of the United States. It is our belief that all these
same taxpayers should receive the benefits of the system when it
becomes operational. There can be no justification for giving this
vast resource that has been financed by the taxpayers away to a
small group of stockholders for their private gain. The taxpayers
have already paid for their right to share in the returns.38
As a result of such opposition, as well as the Kennedy administra-
tion suggestions, the compromise bill was eventually altered to allow
for share ownership to be divided evenly between class A stock, to be
available to the public at large, and class B stock, which could be pur-
chased only by approved communications carriers. 9 This bill was re-
ferred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with instructions to
report back to the Senate floor on August 10 for final debate.40  De-
bate on the Senate floor was heated. Senators Wayne Morse and Estes
Kefauver engaged in a four-day filibuster to prevent passage of any pri-
vate ownership compromise. 41 Comsat supporters broke the proce-
dural stalemate by mustering the two-thirds vote necessary to invoke
cloture,42 thus achieving the first such success since 1927. The fili-
buster was brought to a halt by a vote of sixty-three to twenty-seven,
ment. Levin, Organization and Control of Communications Satellites, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 315, 334 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Levin].
37. GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 55.
38. S. REP. No. 1544, supra note 3, at 49.
39. Id. at 25-27 (statement of President John F. Kennedy).
40. 108 CONG. REC. 15,187-88 (1962).
41. Id. at 16,417.
42. Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1973).
[Vol. 27
with ten members abstaining.43 The Communications Satellite Act was
passed by the Senate on August 17, 1962.'4
The unique structure of Comsat resulted largely from the fierce
legislative controversy over whether the corporation should be publicly
or privately owned. While some legislators, principally Senator Kerr
of Oklahoma and Representative George P. Miller of California, be-
lieved that the biggest communications conglomerates should be
granted rights to develop and use the proposed satellite systems, 45
others, joined by various interest groups, argued that private ownership
would not insure adequate accountability to the public.4" The issue
was resolved by a familiar congressional vehicle, compromise. The
Communications Satellite Corporation was thus a creature of conflicting
congressional ideologies. This anomaly in American business will be
detailed in the next section of this note.
The Communications Satellite Corporation:
"Melding. Variegated Interests"4
7
What emerged from the legislative maneuvering described above
was a statute establishing a privately-owned communications satellite
corporation.4" This private corporation, Comsat, was to be governed
by a board of directors with membership consisting of six public share-
holder designees, six communications common carrier representatives,
and three members appointed by the president of the United States. 49
There was no direct grant of federal money; the initial capitalization
involved the issue of corporate securities.5" Specific sections in the
statute provided for corporate accountability to the president of the
United States, the State Department, and the attorney general. 51 The
newly established corporation was placed under the regulatory purview
of the FCC.5"
Before surveying Comsat's development into a full-fledged inter-
national and domestic carrier's carrier, it is important to reflect on the
43. 108 CONG. Rnc. 16,417 (1962).
44. Id. at 16,926.
45. See GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 52.
46. Id. at 56.
47. See generally Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth Stations: Some
Problems with "Melding Variegated Interests," 76 YALE L.J. 441, 442 & n.5 (1967).
48. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 104-404, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44
(1970).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 733 (1970).
50. See 1973 COMSAT ANN. REP. 100 [hereinafter cited as COMSAT REPORT]. Com-
sat was advanced $500,000 of the interim line of credit up to $5 million to cover initial
costs. Id.
51. 47 U.S.C. §§ 721, 742, 743 (1970).
52. Id. §§ 721(c), 734(b), 741.
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assumptions and fears of those who commented on the new corporation
before it became fully operational in 1965. 53 These comments, written
before the successful launch of "Early Bird," the world's first commer-
cial communications satellite, indicate the expectations of many people
in the United States regarding the effect of this statutory monopoly on
the new age of space communications. Knowledge of these expecta-
tions will be valuable in developing a theoretical framework for use in
the final section of this note, which will consider the proposed legis-
lative changes of 1975.
In 1963, Victor G. Rosenblum stated in his article concerning the
administrative aspects of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962:
The Satellite Communications Act embodies the effort to establish
the broadest possible base of ownership, control, and commitment;
to render a vital service to people throughout the world; and to
show that the American enterprise system, requiring neither sub-
servience of private business to the Government nor dominance of
Government by private business, can thrive on a bona fide partner-
ship of interests. 54
Others, however, were not so optimistic. Many legislators and ob-
servers expressed apprehension about the private enterprise nature of
the system, despite the extensive regulatory provisions. The legislation
as enacted contained a complex matrix of internal checks and balances
which rested upon a number of basic assumptions about the ultimate
functioning of Comsat. Samuel Estep, writing for a symposium on
Comsat at Northwestern University in 1963 listed these assumptions,
which may be summarized as follows:5 (1) Comsat, like AT&T, was
to be an extensive, diversified, nonpolitical, and efficient international
telecommunication network. It was to be composed of U.S. carriers
and foreign partners. (2) Comsat would be a profit-making corpora-
tion, but some of its functions were to be governmental in nature.56
(3) The corporation would make a substantial long-term profit, al-
though returns would be small at best in the early years. (4) Comsat
was to have a space satellite monopoly, but it would foster competition
in the manufacture of equipment for its needs. It was to complement
the existing international communications systems and could benefit
from the expertise of such carriers. (5) Rates were to be integrated
with those of the undersea cables in order to avoid a switch to a cheaper
53. See COMSAT REPORT, supra note 50, at 19.
54. Rosenblum, Regulation in Orbit: Administrative Aspects of the Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, 58 Nw. U.L. Rv. 216, 219 (1963).
55. Estep, Some International Aspects of Communications Satellites Systems, 58
Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 239-49 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Estep].
56. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). Other functions include negotiations with
foreign governments. Id. § 742.
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cable circuit.57  (6) The corporation, at least for its first few years,
was to provide primarily telephone circuits, owing to technological limi-
tations and the priority of telephone use over television use.5 s (7) The
system was to operate at maximum capacity so that third world as well
as developed nations could afford to use the new satellite circuits. 9
(8) The corporation was to coordinate with existing services and re-
ceive a guarantee of heavy usage from the federal government and
AT&T. (9) Foreign groups were to be allowed to own as much as
twenty percent of the stock.0° (10) Foreign governmental agencies
would want to share in the system. (11) Regional cooperation would
be needed in foreign countries, as the placement of earth stations61 in
each country would be economically infeasible.
Estep also listed the following observations: (1) An international
body should be formed to oversee satellite telecommunications.6" (2)
The United States might, for foreign policy reasons, subsidize earth sta-
tions for underdeveloped third world countries. This assistance could
be offered in the form of foreign aid. (3) The corporation could lease
circuits to other countries whose transmissions would not involve the
United States. Functioning as a communications carrier's carrier,
Comsat would lease channels to the carriers, who would in turn lease
them to foreign customers. (4) The corporation should maintain a
close working relationship with NASA. The involvement of substantial
federal expenditures in the development of Comsat's facilities should
not preclude turning over use of either facilities or knowledge to pri-
vate enterprise if such action would benefit the most people.63
57. International record carriers have an indefeasible right of use considered in
their rate base; no such indefeasible right of use is available with satellite circuits. An
indefeasible right of use has been defined as a partial equitable interest that can be in-
cluded for the "used and useful" requirement of FCC rate base determination. See
American Tel. & Tel., 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1160 (1964).
58. Television circuits use broad frequency band lengths, and with a limited num-
ber of available circuits, telephone transmission was given a priority. See Estep, supra
note 55, at 241-42.
59. The initial costs of satellite transmission are greater than costs of existing ter-
restrial means. To make the system economically viable, the number of voice and data
messages must increase tremendously. See id. at 242. -
60. One group or nation could purchase the entire 20% and acquire substantial
influence. Id. at 243-44.
61. Earth stations are operationally connected with one or more terrestrial systems
to transmit signals to the satellite or receive signals from it. See 47 U.S.C. § 702(2)
(1970).
62. The International Telecommunications Union, whose function was mainly
spectrum regulation, lacked the requisite strength. See Estep, supra note 55, at 246.
63. Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, and observations 3 and 4 have all proved
valid. Assumption 4 presents a problem that is discussed infra with section 101 of the
proposed amendments. See notes 130-33 & accompanying text infra. Comsat received
high usage on its circuits and thus had little need for the guarantees mentioned inas-
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICYJanuary 19761
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The assumptions and observations listed above present an histori-
cal framework through which to view the pre-operational Comsat. Es-
tep's analysis did not, however, include a detailed discussion of the po-
tential economic pitfalls that may have led to the Justice Department's
antitrust concerns, mentioned earlier in this note.64
Another commentator, Harvey Levin, discussed the specific haz-
ards which would confront free competition in the first year of satellite
system operations.65 His views may be summarized as follows: (1)
The corporation could eliminate competition. 66  The act as it was cre-
ated in 1962 contained no provisions inhibiting the construction of com-
peting systems. This lack of restriction alone, however, did not provide
insurance against the possibility of anticompetitive practices such as
price fixing. (2) The system could discriminate among potential us-
ers. 7 Case law since United States v. Terminal Railroad,6 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1912, had directed that nonowners in a public
industry could not be excluded from using that system. Nonetheless,
preferential treatment of owners when channel demand on the satellite
system exceeded the available supply would be likely to result in fore-
closed access. (3) The system could discriminate among potential
suppliers. 9 Congress had charged the FCC with maintaining competi-
tion in hardware procurement. A major fear of certain interest groups
and members of Congress was that a carrier-owner would influence
Comsat to purchase hardware from a subsidiary, thus excluding ef-
fective competition from unaffiliated suppliers. This danger would be
increased if the price of the subsidiary's hardware were inflated. The
purchase of overpriced hardware would increase Comsat's usage costs,
thereby justifying a rate base7 ° hike. (4) The corporation could retard
sumption 8. Foreign nationals' holdings have been insignificant over time. Assump-
tions 10 and 11, and observation 1 were all addressed by the formation of Intelsat. See
notes 102-25 & accompanying text infra. Finally, observation 2, the subsidy by the
United States of third world nations' earth stations, has not been seriously considered
in any source.
64. Hearings on Public Policy Questions on the Ownership and Control of a Space
Satellite Communications System Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Se-
lect Comm. on Small Business, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. 28 (1961) (statement of the Depart-
ment of Justice).
65. Levin, supra note 36.
66. Id. at 339-42.
67. Id. at 342-43.
68. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
69. Levin, supra note 36, at 343-45.
70. On an "original cost" (the cost of an asset when first devoted to the public
service) basis, rate base is determined "by a summation of the actual costs of plant and
equipment devoted to the public service (including or plus allowances for interest during
construction), with appropriate deductions for accrued depreciation, and with reasonable
allowances for working capital." J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTItITY RATES
174 (1969).
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technological progress.71  Congress also feared that common carriers
with substantial investments in existing undersea cable and high fre-
quency radio facilities would attempt to protect their investments by
retarding new developments which threatened them with obsolescence.
AT&T, the largest carrier, had invested significantly in the develop-
ment of random access satellites. 72  Other carriers on Comsat's board
of directors continued to lease circuits in AT&T's undersea cables. It
would be less expensive in the event of low traffic volume for AT&T
to use its wholly owned cables rather than a satellite system in which
it was an investor. This practice could have the effect of increasing
the other carriers' unit costs for satellite use, thus providing a negative
incentive for further satellite development. (5) Comsat's pricing pol-
icy could discriminate against disadvantaged nations.7" In order to as-
sure profitable operations, the price the carriers paid Comsat for the
leased channels would have to exceed the cost of providing them. If
joint costs7 4 of developing, building, tracking, and replacing satellites
were substantial, however, and average total costs declined, a price that
covered short-run, or even long-run incremental costs might not yield
revenues adequate to cover the system's total costs. Studies indicated
that average total costs per voice channel would tend to decline indefi-
nitely as the system's capacity rose. 5 Thus, the cost of launching and
using satellites would probably increase with rising channel capacity,
but in a less than directly proportionate ratio.
The equal distribution of joint costs or equal apportionment of
total costs would jeopardize use of the system by economically disad-
vantaged nations lacking the resources to build alternative systems. In
advanced nations, alternatives to the Comsat system were readily avail-
able; potential users would therefore lease the satellite circuits only if
theywere less expensive than using their existing terrestrial systems.
71. Levin, supra note 36, at 34549.
72. A random access system requires a low orbit and approximately twenty satel-
lites. This type of system is distinguished from the geo-synchronous system Comsat ulti-
mately chose. This stationary orbit system utilizes three high altitude satellites, situated
one over each ocean, at an altitude of 22,300 miles above the equator. They remain
stationary in that orbit owing to gravitational forces. ComsAT REPORT, supra note 50,
at 17.
73. Levin, supra note 36, at 349-54.
74. Five types of joint cost allocations were suggested: (a) subsidized by the gov-
ernment, with each link charged only for incremental costs; (b) distributed according
to the user's ability to pay; (c) priced to diffuse benefits widely; (d) shared equally
among the participating earth stations; (e) apportioned according to the relative size of
incremental costs on each line; (f) distributed according to the elasticity of demand for
channels on the several links, Id. at 351-53. All of these choices are predicated on
the fee recovery method selected by NASA to secure payment from Comsat, as provided
in section 201 of the Communications Satellite Act. Id.
75. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 36, at 350 n.112.
January 19761 TELECOMMUNICATIONST"OLICY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
If an advanced nation's traffic were diverted elsewhere, the result
would be higher average total costs for remaining users."6
The hazards summarized above, in conjunction with Estep's as-
sumptions, have presented a perspective from which to view the subse-
quent operations of Comsat. The next section of this note will bring
into focus the problems that faced the corporation after it began to op-
erate in 1965.
The Decision for Private Monopoly:
Subsequent Ramifications
Lingering Concerns
The passage of time did not allay the fears held by those who had
favored public ownership. Five years after the congressional decision
to place Comsat in private hands, FCC Commissioner Nicholas John-
son, criticizing the monopolistic practices displayed by Comsat, asked
in 1967: "Should we permit the entire universe to be divided up, with
Comsat taking the heaven and AT&T taking the earth?" 77
A year later, Rosel H. Hyde, Chariman of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, suggested possible conflicts of interest in the oper-
ation of the new corporation:
The common carriers which today own more than 45% of the stock
of Comsat, have a unique two-fold relationship with it. On the one
hand, as owners of stock, they have a financial interest in the suc-
cess of the company; as nominators of 6 of the 15 directors, they
have a fiduciary obligation to insure the success of the company.
On the other hand as owners and operators of other means of com-
munication, they are the natural competitors of the company in
which they have such large ownership and managerial responsibili-
ties. Finally, since Comsat has a monopoly on the provisions of
international satellite communications facilities, the other carriers
are its customers. Here again they have a dual and divergent in-
terest. As owners they naturally would like to see prices at a level
designed to maximize profits, while as customers they, of course,
would like to have prices as low as possible.78
In short, the statutory monopoly created by the Satellite Act not only
permitted, but indeed compelled cooperation among the participating
carriers.79 This cooperation, however, could at any moment have be-
come collusion. The fear of market restriction and avoidance of tech-
76. Id. at 353.
77. N. JoHNsoN, How To TALK BACK To Your TELEVISION SEr 112 (1967).
78. Hyde, The Role of Competition and Monopoly in the Communications Indus-
tries, 13 ANTrrRUST BuLL. 899, 906 (1968).
79. Industries with a few large firms and several small firms are designated as
oligopolies with competitive fringe. See L. DOYLE, ECONOMCS OF BusiNEsS ENTERPIUS
239 (1952).
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nological innovation articulated originally by Harvey Levin continued
to plague commentators, one of whom complained, "If the industry is
oligopolistic with substantial barriers to entry, and if all the major firms
have a substantial investment in a preexisting plant, they can delay in-
troduction of the innovation until they have fully recouped their invest-
ment in their existing plant. °80 The most basic "form of ownership"
issues raised in 1962 by Senator Kefauver were still being scrutinized.
For example, it was noted that "[lt is equally unlikely that potential
competition will be fostered by a structure which contemplates numer-
ous interlocking directorates; creates a backward and forward vertical
joint venture; and provides for substantial minority interests by com-
panies which are simultaneously potential suppliers, customers, and
competitors.18 1  These continuing expressions of concern have articu-
lated further examples of inherent conflicts within the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962. They have illuminated problems which should
have received greater public and congressional consideration.
Need for Detailed Public Reporting
It is important to recognize that government-created monopolies
are subject to alteration by appropriate legislation. Congress should
not consider its prior decision for private ownership an irrevocable one.
The very gravity of the private ownership decision demands that it be
subjected to regular congressional review. The basic properties of
monopolies have been characterized as "[t]echnical and administrative
inefficiency or slack, unjustified price discrimination, sluggish applica-
tion of new technology, [and] unresponsiveness to new customer needs
and demands .. .8.2 These characteristics have not been the rule
with Comsat, but it has only been operating for ten years. The presi-
dent of the United States is required under section 40483 of the 1962
act to prepare and submit for congressional approval an annual report
on Comsat's activities. Unfortunately, the information contained with-
in these reports predominantly parallels the facts printed in the Comsat
corporate report. A more detailed form of analysis would allow Con-
gress to evaluate Comsat's vitality more effectively. The presidentially-
appointed members of Comsat's board of directors should maintain an
active stance in attaining the release of all corporate information for
the president, and ultimately for the American public. The reporting
requirement in section 4044 of the 1962 act, when read in conjunction
80. Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth Stations: Some Problems with
"Melding Variegated Interests," 76 YALE L.L 441, 461 (1967).
81. Id. at 464-65.
82. Turner, The Role of Anti-trust Policy In the Communications Industry, 13
ANTrImusr BuLL. 873, 878 (1968).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 744 (1970).
84. Id.
J"anuary 1976"1 TELCN --UNCATIONS POLICY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
with section 303, which requires that the board include presidential ap-
pointees,85 would seem to require no less. It is this lack of detailed
information regarding management decisions that may have caused the
once essential common carrier directors to withdraw from Comsat's
board.
Comsat was rapidly becoming as large and powerful a corporation
as the entities that had formed it. As fiduciaries, the carrier directors
had to act in the corporate interest of Comsat. The carrier-assisted
statutory monopoly had come of age; it was now to come in direct com-
petition with those it was meant to serve.
Divestiture: The Mysterious Retreat of the
Common Carriers
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 provided for the initial
issue of only 10 million shares of stock."6 The issues were priced at
twenty dollars per share, and half of the shares were purchased by com-
munications common carriers.8 7 The authors of one text note that
"[t]he four largest carrier stockholders-AT&T, IT&T, General Tele-
phone and Electronics Corporation, and RCA Communications, Inc.-
together held 90.9 percent of the industry segment, and 45.4 percent
of the total issue. AT&T, the single largest stockholder, purchased 29
percent of the industry allocation."'8 The remaining five million
shares were issued to the public; the issue opened on the New York
Stock Exchange trading at forty-six dollars per share. The price rise
is attributable to market speculation resulting from fascination with
space-related securities.
Although Comsat took two years from the passage of the act to
become fully operational, it exhibited a startling growth rate once this
point was reached. The original act was conceived by Congress as a
protective crib for the infant Comsat, and it was soon viewed with in-
creasing antagonism by the expanding corporation, which felt the occa-
sional need to stray beyond the limits of the legislation. One major
excursion occurred in 1966, when Comsat's management made a uni-
lateral policy decision to serve a broad category of supposed authorized
users8 9 directly rather than to confine its service to the common carriers
and serve as a carrier's carrier. Later in that year, the FCC in its "Au-
thorized User Inquiry" failed to authorize Comsat to serve ultimate con-
sumers unless the international carriers had previously denied such
85. Id. § 733.
86. COMSAT REPORT, supra note 50, at 100.
87. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 19, 1964, at 106.
88. D. GILLmORE & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 759 (1969).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 702(7) (1970).
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service. 90  Comsat's management decision provoked a mysterious re-
treat by the carriers from their former positions as shareholders and
board members in the corporation. In the months following the articu-
lation of the new policy decision, IT&T and other carriers divested
themselves of ownership by the sale of their Comsat shares to securities
underwritersY1 It was unclear why the carriers had decided to leave
rather than to oppose the decision from their position as class B share-
holder representatives on Comsat's board of directors. One possible
explanation is that these carriers lacked sufficient voting power to wage
a successful board fight; another is that the divestitures were part of
an effort to forestall an antitrust action which the carriers believed the
Department of Justice was contemplating. Unfortunately, the public
records offered no firm answers. The most substantial evidence on this
matter only tentatively suggested the possible reasons behind the car-
riers' actions. In a hearing conducted by the Communications Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Commerce Committee two witnesses, the Hon.
Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman of the FCC, and Mr. James McCormack,
chairman of the board of Comsat, testified before Senators John 0.
Pastore and Norris Cotton:
Senator COTTON. . . . What is the significance, if any, of the
common carriers divesting themselves of this portion of their stock?
Mr. HYDE. I couldn't add anything to -the statements that have
been published by certain carriers. One of them at least explained
that they were not sympathetic with the policy direction of the cor-
poration and wished to withdraw for that reason. I have no other
information.
Senator COTTON. In what respect were they not in sympathy with
the policies?
Mr. HYDE. This particular carrier stated in their publicity that
since Comsat was undertaking to offer a service direct to customers,
that this was contrary to the original intention that Comsat should
be a carrier's carrier. I am only giving what I recall as their state-
ment, not making any comment on that myself.92
In addition to Chairman Hyde's testimony, the following colloquy took
place between Senator Cotton and Mr. McCormack:
Senator COTTON. I would like to renew my question now about
the reasons that the carrier or carriers objected to the policy of
Comsat and disposed of some of their stock.
Mr. McCoRMACK. Senator Cotton, the public record of the car-
riers' statements is really all we have to go on, too.93
90. Authorized Entities and Users-Comsat, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966).
91. Hearing on the Election of the Board of Directors of the Communications Sat-
ellite Corporation Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 5
(1969).
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Acting in the wake of the carrier divestitures, Congress amended
the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to specify that common car-
rier representation on the board of directors of Comsat was to be de-
termined according to the percentage of stock they collectively owned.
The original act had provided for six common carrier directors regard-
less of the percentage of their stock ownership. 94
Three years after the voluntary divestitures, the FCC determined
that AT&T was directly competing with Comsat in the domestic satellite
field and as a result ordered AT&T to divest itself of all its Comsat
holdings."5 The FCC explained:
However, in this field the underlying considerations which moti-
vated Congress to permit and encourage AT&T's ownership in
Comsat are no longer controlling. On the contrary, the competitive
roles which Comsat and AT&T are assuming in the domestic com-
munications field dictate the need for maximum independence
from each other and an arms-length relationship. 96
Although the reasons behind the various divestitures may never be fully
understood, the final result is evident. Comsat, once 50 percent owned
and controlled by the major common carriers, has become a corporation
equal in power to the carriers that created it.
Reflection on the legislative hearings preceding the original act
further demonstrates the significance of these divestitures. Comsat
was a compromise between the extremes of an international carrier
joint venture, advocated by the FCC Ad Hoc Committee and originally
by Senator Kerr, 91 and a publicly-owned corporation, urged by Senator
Kefauver and the Americans for Democratic Action. In the process
leading to the compromise, Senator Kerr's Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences adopted an amendment to the president's bill9"
which, in part, deleted language empowering the Department of State
to "conduct or supervise" foreign negotiations of the corporation and
replaced it with a provision that the department could "advise" the cor-
poration of foreign policy considerations. "9 This modification was pro-
posed by Senator Kerr, who favored a consortium of international car-
94. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 733 (1975) with id. § 733(a) (1970).
95. Establishment of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities by Nongov-
ernmental Entities, 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972). Comsat later organized a wholly owned
subsidiary, Comsat General, which was created to own and operate Comsat's domestic
satellite interests. It will build and launch four satellites to be used as part of AT&T's
domestic system. Communications Satellite Corporation, 42 F.C.C.2d 677-78 (1973).
96. Id. at 679.
97. GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 52-53. Senator Kerr later compromised and
sponsored the administration's bill, with the understanding that he could offer amend-
ments to alter the government's supervisory role. Id.
98. See S. REP. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4.
99. Id. at 64. The language of § 402 of the Satellite Act as amended includes
the word "advise." 47 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
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tiers and anticipated sustained and complete participation of the major
carriers in the decision-making processes of the corporation's board of
directors.
In general, the foreign policy checks and balances written into the
act reflect an acute awareness of the long-established relationship be-
tween United States international carriers and telecommunications sys-
tems owned by foreign governments. 100 The aggressive stance of the
corporation in its attempt at serving the ultimate consumer directly,101
to the international carriers' potential detriment, was a catalyst in caus-
ing the retreat of its early supporters and thus in undermining this long-
standing relationship. The same aggressive mode of operation, which
has come to characterize the corporation, had a further effect on United
States foreign relations during the negotiations between Comsat, as the
designated entity of the United States, and the other participating world
governments concerning Intelsat, the international space satellite con-
sortium.
Intelsat: Legitimizing the U.S. National Interest in a
Global Communications System
"Global communications control, important in the past, today has
become indispensable for the exercise of international authority.' 110 2
In October of 1963, the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) met in Geneva to allocate high frequency radio spectrum
space.'0 3 It was at this conference that a plan for an international com-
munications satellite association was first conceived. Nine months
later, on July 28, 1964, nineteen nations agreed'0 4 to establish a global
communications union dealing solely with satellites. 05 The United
States, possessing major technological advantage, delegated Comsat to
serve as its official participant in this system, which was named
Intelsat.'00  Evidence of the power wielded by the United States in the
100. GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 49-50.
101. Hearing on the Election of the Board of Directors of the Communication Sat-
ellite Corporation Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1969).
102. H. ScaHL, MXss COMmUNCATIONS AND AMmucA, EmIam 127 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as SCHmLER].
103. Id. at 131.
104. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Com-
munications Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705 [hereinafter cited as
Interim Arrangments Agreement]. These arrangements included two documents, one
known as the "Intergovernmental Agreement," and the other termed the "Special Agree-
ment."
105. Segal, Communication Satellites-Progress and the Road Ahead, 17 VAD. L.
Rnv. 677, 696 (1964).
106. SCmLLER, supra note 102, at 136.
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formation of Intelsat is demonstrated by the management structure
which was adopted. Comsat emerged as the general manager re-
sponsible for system design, development, construction, operation, and
maintenance. 10 7 Voting representation was to be determined by a na-
tion's traffic volume, a standard which assured the United States the
position of greatest power.'08
The United States held 61 percent of all stock and voting rights
and therefore had veto power over all proposals.' 0 9 Article 9 of the
"Special Agreement," a corollary of the "Intergovernmental Agree-
ment" establishing Intelsat, provided that rates were "to cover amortiza-
tion of the capital cost of the space segment, an adequate compensation
for the use of capital, and the estimated operating, maintenance, and
administrative costs of the space segment.""'  The third world was vir-
tually excluded from the original agreement and the negotiations which
preceded it. This fact was verified in a provision of the "Interim Ar-
rangements Agreement," which declared: "Shares reserved for possi-
ble new entrants, no matter how numerous, cannot exceed 17 percent
of the total.""'
Major conflicts developed over Comsat's power in the area of pro-
curement of satellite components. The corporation had the power to
subcontract with itself or any other United States corporation of its
choosing. The Europeans were infuriated at this power, as they had
made 25 percent of the original contribution and had received only 4
percent of the Intelsat contracts."' The growing sentiment against
Comsat was expressed effectively by a British delegate who stated: "It
is managing agent, with all the importance that results, and, in addition,
it has its independent, quite separate interests as a U.S. corporation
... . To the critical eye Comsat is Lord High Executioner and Lord
High Everything Else.""' 3
The delegates of this first meeting required that "Definitive Ar-
rangements" be submitted no later than January 1, 1969." M A final
accord was reached early in 1971, after much renegotiation. The Swiss
Review of World Affairs, analyzing the mood surrounding this reor-
ganization, stated:
107. See GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 158.
108. COMSAT REPORT, supra note 50, at 72.
109. SCHILLER, supra note 102, at 136. This amount dwindled to 40% in 1973. See
COMSAT REPORT, supra note 50, at 72.
110. Interim Arrangements Agreement, supra note 104, at 1752.
111. SCHILLER, supra note 102, at 141.
112. Interview with Dr. Reinhold Steiner, Intelsat negotiator for Switzerland, in
Washington, D.C., Aug. 1, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Steiner Interview].
113. O'Lone, U.S. Dominance Seen Hindering Intelsat, AvITrON WEEK & SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 28, 1967, at 31.
114. Interim Arrangements Agreement, supra note 104, at 1713-14.
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Modern telecommunications techniques had reached a stage of de-
velopment which appeared to offer unlimited future potential. At
the same time, the United States occupied a privileged position in
Intelsat which, while at one time might have been acceptable, had
in the meantime lost its justification. As a result, in the long term
a conflict was bound to arise between Washington's understandable
efforts to maintain its dominating position and the desire of the
other partners for a genuine internationalization of Intelsat."15
A further insight into the dynamics of the negotiations was pro-
vided during an interview with one of the foreign representatives. Dr.
Reinhold Steiner, recalling his experiences as the Swiss negotiator, char-
acterized the tactical attitudes of the Comsat representatives as "strong-
armed and ruthless.""" Steiner recalled numerous instances in which
the United States took unfair advantage of its technologically superior
position by placing complex technical proposals on the desks of foreign
delegates only moments before a vote on adoption was to be taken.
Using the veiled threat of veto power, the United States pushed agree-
ments through the governing bodies of Intelsat." 7
Although the United States could unilaterally control the day-to-
day functioning of Intelsat, it could not, because of a provision requir-
ing unanimous approval, dictate the terms of the final agreement.
Three years of negotiation preceded the approval of this agreement by
the eighty-three member nations. Although on the surface the provi-
sions of the final agreement appeared to reflect substantial decreases
in United States voting power, closer analysis revealed no significant
erosion. An apparently significant revision embodied in the new
agreement provided for a reduction in Coinsat's proportionate voting
power from 53 percent in 1971 to 38.28 percent in 1974.118 The ef-
fect of this reduction, however, was for practical purposes nullified by
the simultaneous switch from a simple majority provision to a two-thirds
requirement for all votes of the governing body."19 One revision, how-
ever, reflected a successful effort on the part of foreign participants to
increase their share of power in Intelsat by reducing Comsat's authority.
Under the Definitive Arrangements, the managerial function was shifted
over a period of three years from Comsat to an independent director
general. 20
115. Blancpain, Intelsat's Path of Thornes, Swiss REv. oF WORLD AFFAms, Oct.
1970, at 19.
116. Steiner Interview, supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. COMSAT REPORT, supra note 50, at 64.
119. Id.
120. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organ-
ization, Intelsat, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3851.
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Among the major membership of Intelsat, only Comsat was a pri-
vate corporation. Dr. Steiner explained that this distinction was not
welcomed by the foreign participants, who would have preferred to
deal with a nationalized agency similar to themselves.' 2 ' In defending
its private status, Comsat insisted that its behavior in the international
body was uninfluenced by this status. 22 Nevertheless, a recent contro-
versy concerning the interpretation of article 14(d) of the Definitive
Agreement' 23 has cast doubt on the veracity of Comsat's assertion.
Article 14(d), which allowed Intelsat members to establish re-
gional satellite systems separate from the global network, was viewed
by foreign members as being vulnerable to veto only by a two-thirds
vote. Comsat, fearful of making concessions to other nations in order
to secure a veto, refused to abide by this two-thirds interpretation.
Comsat's prior ability to control Intelsat proposals by virtue of its 38.28
percent voting share had been a powerful bargaining tool in its com-
mercial dealings with United States corporations who were potential In-
telsat subcontractors. Acting in its corporate self-interest, Comsat en-
listed the cooperation of the Department of State in fighting the two-
thirds veto requirement.' 24 Establishing American leadership in a
global communications satellite system was an avowed foreign policy
objective of the United States which did not always harmonize with the
goal of increasing international peace and understanding: "Leadership
in the sense of financial domination [is] incompatible with increasing
empathy or relaxing tensions."' 25
Proposed 1974 Amendments to the
Satellite Act of 1962
In May of 1974, the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP)
sent a series of proposals amending the 1962 Communications Satellite
Act to Senator Pastore's Communications Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Commerce and to Representative Stagger's Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce.' 26 The original goal of these pro-
121. Steiner Interview, supra note 112.
122. Interview with William English, Vice-President of Comsat General, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Aug. 1, 1974.
123. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organ-
ization, Intelsat, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3851.
124. Steiner Interview, supra note 112.
125. GALLOWAY, supra note 13, at 121.
126. These proposals were introduced in 1974, but no action was taken at that time.
They were reintroduced in the spring of 1975. See S. Doc. No. 1683, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 101-09 (1975); H.R. Doc. No. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-09 (1975).
The provisions are as follows: In addition to executive branch involvement provided for
in section 201 of the original act, the amendment would specifically allow such involve-
ment to cover planning and development of additional satellite systems created pursuant
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posals was apparently to make sweeping revisions in the telecommuni-
cations policy of the United States. "This wonderful objective," stated
Comsat President Dr. Joseph Charyk, "got watered down to a cleanup
proposal."'12 7 The amendments as a whole have been frequently char-
acterized as housekeeping measures. For example, an official in the
FCC's Common Carrier Bureau characterized the amendments as
"mere statutory confirmations of the status quo."'128 Such a description
is undoubtedly appropriate for the bulk of the proposed legislation.
For example, section 101 of the amendments 29 would permit United
States corporations other than Comsat to participate in specialized in-
ternational communications satellite systems. This provision would ex-
tend executive branch involvement to include planning and develop-
ment of additional satellite systems created pursuant to any agreement
between the United States and foreign nations. Section 101 of the
amendments, in light of the prior congressional decision to place Com-
sat in private hands, would not significantly change the status quo.'80
It is only logical that Congress would want the executive branch to
oversee newly conceived international satellite systems, just as it over-
sees the Comsat-Intelsat relationship. No one expects the executive
to any agreement between the United States and foreign countries. Id. § 101. The
amendment would delete section 201(c)(8) from the original act, thus removing Com-
sat's financial activities from the purview of the FCC. Id. § 102. One proposal would
amend section 301 of the original act to allow Comsat to be governed by the corporate
laws of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated rather than restricting it to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Business Corporation Act. Another proposal would amend section
303(a) of the original act to delete the requirement for three presidentially-appointed
directors on Comsat's board. Id. § 104. A further proposal would amend section 304
(a) to permit Comsat to issue stock having par value and amend section 304(b) (2) to
eliminate a special class of stock for common carriers and to reduce the permissible
amount of shares that can be held by such carriers from 50% to 5%. Id. § 105. An
amendment to section 305 would clarify the policy that Comsat does not have exclusive
statutory authority to operate additional systems separate from Intelsat Id. § 106. An
additional provision amends section 402, and extends State Department involvement to
new international satellite systems developed pursuant to intergovernmental agreements
to which the United States is a party. Id. § 107. An amendment to section 404 of
the original act would effect a grammatical alteration. The final proposal would require
the president to report to Congress regarding additional international communications
satellite systems. Id. § 109.
127. Interview with Dr. Joseph Charyk, President of Comsat, in Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 2, 1974.
128. Interview with an FCC Common Carrier Bureau Official, in Washington,
D.C., Aug. 6, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with FCC Official]. The interviewee
would prefer to remain anonymous.
129. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975); R.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1975).
130. Id. Congress favored choosing a private entity to participate in Intelsat, the
"global system"; therefore, the choice of another private entity in specialized systems
presents no apparent conflict.
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branch to play a passive role in systems having such an obvious impact
on foreign policy. Comsat, however, did not view this amendment as
having a "housekeeping" effect and argued as follows:
We believe that abandoning the chosen instrument policy of Con-
gress in favor of a policy that cannot achieve the advantages of the
competition it extols serves no real purpose and will defeat the na-
tional goals of establishing international satellite systems expedi-
tiously and under arrangements which provide effective and eco-
nomical service to U.S. users. Consequently, we recommend that
all the provisions of H.R. 6809 permitting participation in interna-
tional communications satellite systems by U.S. entities other than
Comsat be deleted, and that the fundamental policy of Congress
when it enacted -the Satellite Act-namely, that U.S. participation
in all international satellite systems be through Comsat-be af-
firmed.1 '
What Comsat failed to recognize is that the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962 created the "private corporation" to be the United States
participant in "the global system;"'13 2 it mentions no limitations on own-
ership of specialized satellites systems or general domestic systems.' 33
Sections 107, 108, and 109 of the amendments 3 4 are necessary con-
comitants to section 101 and are therefore subject to the same analysis.
Section 106,"5 denying Comsat a statutory monopoly on other in-
ternational satellite systems, is consistent with this nation's contempo-
rary domestic satellite polciy, which encourages increased participation.
In this regard, NASA administrator Stephen Doyle, a former OTP
counsel, stated that "the revision of Section 305 makes it clear that
Comsat is only the chosen instrument for Intelsat, and not for any or
all international systems."' 36  It should be noted, however, that section
106 would not preclude Comsat, through its wholly owned subsidiary
Comsat General, from monopolizing future international satellite sys-
tems on its own, without the benefit of statutory protection.' 3 7 Under
131. Letter from Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, President of Comsat, to Representative
Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
May 30, 1975.
132. See 47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1970).
133. Id. § 701(d). The only limitation on the creation of these systems is that
they be consistent with the act. For example, specialized systems might be justified by
unique governmental needs; general domestic systems could be established if required by
the national interest. Id.
134. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-7 (1975).
135. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-7 (1975).
136. Interview with Stephen Doyle, NASA Administrator, in Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 1, 1974.
137. See Communications Satellite Corporation, 42 F.C.C.2d 677, 680 (1973).
Comsat is authorized to establish Comsat General as a separate corporate entity to
which it intends to transfer all of its non-Intelsat activities.
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a scheme of open competition, there would be nothing to stop Comsat
General from using its own expertise to assume leadership in establish-
ing other systems.
Section 103,138 which would allow Comsat to be governed by state
corporate laws, would have no serious effect on the conduct or charac-
ter of -the corporation's operations. The provision in section 105'11 for
reducing the permissible size of common carrier holdings would have
no immediate relevance in light of the aforementioned common carrier
divestitures.
Nonetheless, two remaining sections of the proposed legislation
are substantially more than housekeeping measures. The first, section
102,140 would delete the requirement that Comsat receive FCC ap-
proval before issuing any debt or equity securities. An official of the
FCC Common Carrier Bureau expressed "serious reservations" about
the propriety of this proposed change. 141 The present requirement for
FCC financial control is unique. Those in favor of removing this re-
quirement point out that the FCC does not exercise similar financial
control over other common carriers. 42 These parties claim that the
technological and operational uncertainties which originally warranted
this departure from normal procedures are no longer present. This ar-
gument ignores, however, the facts that Comsat still occupies a unique
position and that this situation has not changed. Although there is no
hard data to substantiate the various estimates, ranging to $25,000,-
000,000,143 of the value of government investment in satellite and mis-
sile launcher research and development, it is evident that this invest-
ment accrued to Comsat and that no other existing private industry has
reaped a comparable windfall. Underscoring Comsat's uniqueness is
its status as the entity statutorily chosen by the United States to negoti-
ate with foreign governments through the Intelsat system. In view of
the significant benefits and responsibilities bestowed upon Comsat by
the United States government, it is not at all unreasonable to require
an extra degree of financial scrutiny. This close financial scrutiny has
become especially important since the FCC required that Comsat form
"a separate corporate subsidiary to engage in all domestic satellite ac-
138. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975).
139. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-
5 (1975).
140. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975).
141. Interview with F.C.C. Official, supra note 128.
142. See, e.g., Memorandum from Clay T. Whitehead, OTP Director, to Repre-
sentative Carl Albert, Apr. 5, 1974, on file at the Office of Telecommunications Policy.
143. See Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Before the Senate Comm. on Aeronauti-
cal and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1962).
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tivities" and in any other ventures not related to Intelsat."' The com-
mission subsequently authorized Comsat's major financial investment
of up to two hundred million dollars in its wholly-owned domestic sub-
sidiary, Comsat General, 145 but cautioned Comsat in early 1974 not to
jeopardize any ability to meet its obligations to Intelsat's global system
through so substantial an investment. 14 6 Comsat's desire for both in-
ternational and domestic satellite participation has injected inconsist-
encies into its own arguments supporting the removal of the FCC's fi-
nancial scrutiny. In Comsat's reply in the FCC satellite rate investiga-
tion,"' the corporation stated:
But the Trial Staff cannot deny the risks of an entirely new enter-
prise with no demonstrated earnings capability, no reasonable way
for investors to anticipate the level of earnings eventually to be ex-
pected, and no indication as to when, if ever, earnings would -reach
an adequate level. Nor can the Trial Staff deny the risks flowing
from the necessity to operate in a business environment requiring
the participation of foreign entities in the INTELSAT system, in
which major policy and investment decisions would be group deci-
sions. Nor can the Trial Staff deny the risks and uncertainties in-
herent in a business with no assured customer base and in which
the principal customers are also principal competitors. And the
Trial Staff cannot deny the threat of competition from cables and
from domestic and regional satellite systems [or microwave]. 148
While Comsat's argument was intended to distinguish its present
situation from that at its inception, the risks which it mentioned above
are as relevant to its new domestic subsidiary as they were to the young
Comsat over ten years ago. Thus, Comsat itself seems to have pre-
sented a cogent argument for continued financial scrutiny.
The corporation's investment of a sizable amount of its assets in
Comsat General cannot be discounted as risk-free. If the Comsat Gen-
eral-AT&T domestic satellite system 14 9 which is now being designed
were to be a financial failure owing to any unforeseen risk, what would
become of Comsat's stock in its subsidiary? What would be the subse-
quent effect on Comsat's role regarding its Intelsat commitment? The
144. Establishment of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities by Nongovern-
mental Entities, 38 F.C.C.2d 665, 685 (1972).
145. Communications Satellite Corporation, 45 F.C.C.2d 288, 289 (1974).
146. Communications Satellite Corporation, 45 F.C.C.2d 444, 446 (1974). See
also 108 CONG. REC. 16,887 (1962). Senator Russell B. Long observed that the Com-
mon Carrier Bureau of 1962 was unable to regulate the members of its industry. Id.
But see address by Richard Wiley, Common Carrier Conference, in Washington, D.C.,
June 30, 1975 (depicting the year 1976 as his "year of the Common Carrier").
147. Summary Reply & Brief of the Communication Satellite Corporation, No.
16,070 at 15-16 (FCC May 12, 1975).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Communications Satellite Corporation, 42 F.C.C.2d 677 (1973).
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commission "strongly opposes" the repeal of its statutory power to scru-
tinize Comsat's financial condition. 150 The FCC has stated:
In reviewing the purpose of Section 201 (c)(8), it is noted -that
Congress sought to assure that Comsat, as the sole entity in the
United States authorized to participate in the ownership of the
global communications satellite system, be financially able to pur-
sue such mission. It is particularly important that this ability be
preserved in view of -the recent expansion of Comsat into non-
INTELSAT endeavors, such as domestic and maritime satellites. 151
In September of 1975, the FCC denied 52 a request by Comsat that
it be permitted to advance its domestic subsidiary, Comsat General,
another forty million dollars, because the commission was not per-
suaded that the advancement would not "impinge upon Comsaes
INTELSAT responsibilities."' 5 3  In refusing to allow this specific ad-
vancement by Comsat to its subsidiary, the FCC in effect assured the
Intelsat members, who by the nature of the Intelsat agreements are
150. FEDEArL COMMuNICAONS CoMnIrssION, CoMMENTS ON H.R. 14305, A BILL
To AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLrI AcT OF 1962 4
(1975).
151. Id. at 4-5. The commission's comments relative to section 201(c)(8) of the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 are set out in full below:
"The Commission strongly opposes the repeal of Section 201(c)(8), a key section
in the regulatory scheme established by the Act. The need for such provision is as com-
pelling now, if not more so, than in the past, since its purpose is to enable ongoing super-
vision by the Commission of Comsat's financing to insure consistency with the most ef-
ficient and economical operation of the corporation. As such it is an integral part of
the Commission's responsibility under the Act.. .. In authorizing domestic satellites,
the Commission specifically required the formation by Comsat of a subsbidiary, and cited
Section 201(c)(8) in acting to protect the financial integrity of Comsat's participation
in INTELSAT. Review will continue to be important in the future, particularly since
Comsat has indicated that the subsidiary may undertake additional endeavors which may
impact on Comsat's financial status.
"While it is true that the Commission does not now have authority over the financ-
ing of other communications carriers, it must be emphasized that Comsat is the only
such carrier with a monopoly position designated by tatute. Moreover, regulatory au-
thority of this sort is not unique. -Indeed, Congress specifically stated that Section 201
(c) (8) was based on the statutory provisions giving the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the Federal Power Commission similar authority.
"In summary, we believe retention of the Commission's regulatory authority over
Comsat's financing is essential to insure benefits to the public in terms of rates and to
protect Comsat's role as the U.S.-designated entity in the INTELSAT system. In addi-
tion it is consistent with the authority generally found necessary in the effective regula-
tion of common carriers and public utilities."
152. It must be noted carefully that section 201(c)(8) provides for commission reg-
ulation only when securities are being issued, funds are being borrowed, or debt is being
assumed by Comsat. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201(c) (8), 47 U.S.C.
§ 721(c) (8) (1970). There are no statutory restrictions on the "advancement" of funds
as in the instant case. Moreover, there is no indication in the Communications Satel-
lite Act of 1962 that the commission is empowered to regulate Comsat General.
153. Communications Satellite Corporation, 55 F.C.C.2d 565-66 (Sept. 17, 1975).
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concerned with Comsat's continued financial stability, of careful finan-
cial scrutiny by the commission. Without this single monitoring pro-
cedure, Comsat would appear to be a statutory monopoly lacking even
the slightest regulation. Moreover, Comsat has not shown that FCC
scrutiny has ever operated to the detriment of the corporation's lawful
business interests. Absent such a showing, this regulation must remain
enforced.
The second and final section of the new legislation requiring spe-
cial attention is section 104,'11 which calls for the removal of the three
presidentially-appointed directors from Comsat's board. One com-
mentator suggests that there are two types of roles that the presiden-
tially-appointed directors could fulfill:
The first is that they are to use their presence and voting power
within the board to bring influence to bear in the making of deci-
sions affecting the public interest ....
The other conception of the government directors' role is that
they are to serve primarily-and perhaps exclusively-as a two-
way 'window' for the President and other governmental agencies,
keeping them informed from the inside of the corporation's activi-
ties, and serving to communicate especially the President's views
to the board. 155
Unfortunately, not because of the requirement for their existence, but
rather by the method of their selection, these appointees have done
nothing to distinguish themselves from those regular board members 56
who are concerned solely with the profit and growth aspects of the cor-
poration. Comsat President Dr. Joseph Charyk commented on the in-
tended function of the presidential appointees as follows:
Well, they were intended to watch out for the public interest while
still carrying out fiduciary responsibility to stockholders. In prac-
tice, however, these appointees have been indistinguishable from
the other Board members. We are a chosen instrument and do
speak for the United States and present the U.S. image. This extra
responsibility requires people like this on the Board who can
answer to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the govern-
ment. They are an asset. I don't think they should be elim-
inated.157
It is not surprising that Dr. Charyk, as president of Comsat, would
154. S. 1693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1975); H.R. 6809, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-
5 (1975).
155. Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors In a Private Corporation-
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. REv. 350, 353-54 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
156. Id. at 355-56. The first three directors were Clark Kerr, President of the Uni-
versity of California; George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO; Frederick G. Donner,
Chairman of the Board of General Motors.
157. Interview with Dr. Joseph Charyk, president of Comsat, in Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 2, 1974.
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favor the retention of these appointees, for they give the appearance
of representing the public without actually doing so. One official of
the FCC Common Carrier Bureau, commenting on this dilemma, ex-
plained:
You have a negative result where the general public expects that
there is more regulation and control than there is in fact ....
They may leave sort of an illusion of an independent watchdog
when in fact there really isn't very much going on.'6 8
In an article on the Comsat board of directors," 9 one author de-
scribes the parallel circumstances attending the formation of the Union
Pacific Railroad, in which a minority of public directors were also ap-
pointed by the president to a corporation created by the federal govern-
ment. In the Report of the Government Directors of the Union Pacific
Railroad for 1882,160 it is noted:
The obvious purpose of the law creating the office of Government
director was to secure in the actual and active operation of the
company representatives of the large interest held by the Govern-
ment in the road. It was intended that the Government's represen-
tatives should not merely be a medium of communication through
whom what had been done might be learned, but that they should
have a voice in the direction, having intimate knowledge of its af-
fairs, and keeping themselves thoroughly informed concerning all
its transactions and the policy of its administration. 16'
The public board members of the Union Pacific were excluded from
major policy decisions in large part because of their assertiveness.- 62
These directors were finally eliminated from the board when the rail-
road went into receivership because it was unable to pay back its loan
from the federal government. 63 Comsat does not appear to be on the
brink of receivership, but the possibility of excluding board members
who might act against the corporation's interest must be considered.
Such a conflict could arise if a presidential appointee were to support
the FCC's findings in the Comsat rate investigation.'64 Even assuming
these difficulties, the solution to this problem is probably not to be
found in complete elimination of the three posts. Dispensing with
these positions would foreclose even the possibility of board accounta-
bility to the public. The solution lies in finding and appointing people
158. Interview with FCC Official, supra note 128.
159. Schwartz, supra note 155, at 358.
160. H.R. Exnc. Doc. No. 94, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1883), reprinted in S.
ExFc. Doc. No. 69, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 183, 186 (1886).
161. Id.
162. See Schwartz, supra note 155, at 359-60.
163. Id.
164. See Reply Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Argument of the Sec-
retary of Defense, The Communications Satellite Corporation, No. 16070 (FCC Oct. 30,
1975).
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who will work conscientiously to protect the public trust with which
their positions are invested.
Conclusion
This note has attempted to describe the general background and to
provide an analysis of United States satellite communications policy em-
bodied as it is in the Comsat concept. It has examined what Comsat
was intended to be, what it could have been, and what it has actually
become. Certainly none of the original legislators intended Comsat to
conduct itself in a manner which would alienate foreign members of
Intelsat; nor did they intend a later legislative review of Comsat's func-
tion to result in an unambitious amendment proposal which introduces
no new ideas and seeks change only through the elimination of a few
previously enacted regulations.
This note will now suggest two types of modifications of the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962. The first enumerates specific alter-
ations of the proposed amendments, and the second develops a blue-
print for a future policy relating to United States representation in Intel-
sat.
Legislation creating substantial change beneficial to the public in-
terest is still possible. In particular, such legislation should contain, if
the present corporate structure is assumed: (1) a clear decision
whether the domestic "open skies" policy, which requires a diversity
of multiple satellite systems, 165 should apply to United States partici-
pants in future international systems; (2) a nomination procedure' 66
for presidential board appointees that would insure that experts,
charged with upholding the public interest, could gain board member-
ship; (3) a definitive statement of the FCC's role in the financial affairs
of both Comsat and its subsidiary, Comsat General; (4) a provision re-
garding the rate structure of Comsat that would compel the "flow-
through" of satellite circuit rate reductions to the ultimate consumer.
This requirement would avoid the realization of windfall profits by the
"middleman" international common carriers if such a reduction were
ordered in the rates of the carriers' carrier. 167
165. See Phillips, Domestic Telecommunications: An Overview, 29 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 235, 245-46 n.34 (1972).
166. Priority for nomination should be given to those familiar with the area of
commercial telecommunications and interested in protecting the consumer. Individuals
with this background could be drawn from universities, the Consumer Union, active
church groups, labor unions, public interest law firms, newspaper staffs, and the federal
Legal Services Administration. Special consideration should be given to attorneys from
the antitrust division of the Department of Justice. The nominations should be brought
forward by the president and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
167. A "flow-through" would allow the amount of reduction ordered by the FCC
in Comsat's rates to be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Commission has stated
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Moreover, Congress should consider the advisability of the follow-
ing measures: (1) a provision compelling Comsat to subsidize the
construction of earth stations for third world nations in underdeveloped
parts of the world;168 (2) a provision requiring that any domestic sys-
tem approved must donate the use of a certain number of satellite tele-
vision circuits to educational television and the Public Broadcasting Sys-
tem.
If, however, Congress were willing to reconsider the more funda-
mental question of the appropriateness of its grant of a perpetual statu-
tory monopoly regarding representation in Intelsat, it would once again
have to consider the public ownership alternative. The debate would
certainly be long, bitter, and full of compromise. One procedure Con-
gress might consider would direct that a measure establishing a statu-
tory monopoly of the type currently granted to Comsat contain a provi-
sion for automatic expiration of the monopoly at the end of a ten-year
period. At this time, a bifurcated legislative hearing would be required
concerning the renewal of the monopoly. In the first stage of this hear-
ing, the monopoly holder would be directed to show cause why owner-
ship of the United States' interest in Intelsat should not revert to the
federal government. This hearing would be an adversary proceeding,
at which other interested parties, including groups favoring public own-
ership, would present their arguments before Congress. Should the
private company fail at this stage of the hearing, ownership would con-
ditionally vest in the United States government, subject to the outcome
of the second part of the hearing, which would take place within ninety
that a reduction in the charges to the international record carriers should be reflected
promptly and fairly in rates to the public. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 45 F.C.C.2d 252
(1974).
168. See Estep, supra note 55, at 246. In 1967, President Johnson presented the
case for foreign aid in the form of communications links:
"We support a global system of commercial satellite communications which is avail-
able to all nations-large and small, developed and developing--on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
"To have access to a satellite in the sky, a nation must have access to a ground
station to transmit and receive its messages. There is a danger that smaller nations,
unable to finance or utilize expensive ground stations, may become orphans of this tech-
nological advance.
"We believe that satellite ground stations should be an essential part of the infra-
structure of developing nations. Smaller nations may consider joint planning for a
ground station to serve the communications needs of more than one nation in the same
geographic area. We will consider technical assistance that will assist their planning
effort.
"Developing nations should be encouraged to commence construction of an efficient
system of ground stations as soon as possible. When other financing is not available,
we will consider financial assistance to emerging nations to build the facilities that will
permit them to share in the benefits of a global communications satellite system." H.R.
Doc. No. 157, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
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days. In the second stage of the hearing, all interested companies and
those favoring public ownership would be allowed to apply for a grant
of the authority to represent the interests of the United States in the
global system. Should the original holder succeed at the first stage of
the hearing, the burden at the second stage would be placed upon the
new entrants to prove that they are better able to occupy this repre-
sentative position. A company which failed in the first stage of the
hearing would enter the second stage with no privileges and would be
on an equal footing with all new entrants.
Under this system there are three possible outcomes: a continua-
tion of the status quo, a transfer of the statutory grant to a new com-
pany, or a reversion to public ownership with adequate provision for
the buyback of the monopoly holder's capital assets. This plan would
eliminate the deleterious effects of legislative inertia which have be-
come so evident in the recent proposals amending the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962.169
Jordan Richard Kerner*
169. The opportunity to invest in a profitable communications corporation undeni-
ably benefits a certain portion of the public. The vast majority of Americans, however,
are not investors, and their interest in the lowest possible rates is potentially at odds
with the profit interest of investors. When private corporations engage in public service
enterprises for profit, public benefit is not an inevitable or natural outcome. The public
interest in communications common carriers demands efficient, reliable service at the
lowest possible rates to the ultimate consumer. It is this principle which must guide
present and prospective legislation in the field of satellite communications.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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